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Abstract  
One of the leading criticisms of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is the 
presence of so-called “anomalies”, i.e. empirical evidence of abnormal behaviour of 
asset prices which is inconsistent with market efficiency. However, most studies do 
not take into account transaction costs. Their existence implies that in fact traders 
might not be able to make abnormal profits. This paper examines whether or not 
anomalies such as intraday or time of the day effects give rise to exploitable profit 
opportunities by replicating the actions of traders. Specifically, the analysis is based 
on a trading robot which simulates their behaviour, and incorporates variable 
transaction costs (spreads). The results suggest that trading strategies aimed at 
exploiting daily patterns do not generate extra profits. Further, there are no 
significant differences between sub-periods (2005-2006 – “normal”; 2007-2009 – 
“crisis”;2010-2011 – “post-crisis). 
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1. Introduction 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been highly criticised during the last twenty years, 
especially on the basis of empirical evidence suggesting the presence of so-called “anomalies”, i.e. 
abnormal behaviour of asset prices which is seen as inconsistent with market efficiency.  
One of the best known anomalies is the presence of intraday patterns, i.e. more intensive trading at 
the beginning and the end of the trading day combined with higher price volatility (Admati and 
Pﬂeiderer, 1988). For example, Wood et al. (1985) reported that all positive returns are earned 
during the first thirty minutes and at the market close. Harris (1986) showed that prices and last 
trades tend to be up during the first 45 minutes of trading sessions (all days except Monday). Such 
patterns were also mentioned by Thaler (1987) and Levy (2002). Strawinski and Slepaczuk (2008) 
found evidence of intraday patterns in the Warsaw Stock Exchange as well. 
The main limitation of the above mentioned studies is that they neglect transaction costs: 
incorporating spreads, commissions and other fees and payments connected with the trading process 
can change the picture dramatically. Specifically, it can become clear that some of these 
“anomalies” cannot in fact be exploited, i.e. profitable trading is not possible, and this inability to 
obtain extra profits is fully consistent with the EMH.  
The present study examines intraday patterns using a trading robot which simulates the actions of 
the trader and incorporates some transaction costs (spreads) into the analysis. The aim is to show 
that, as mentioned above, the presence of anomalies by itself does not necessarily represent 
evidence of market inefficiency, since it might not be possible to exploit them in practice. We 
analyse both a mature and an emerging stock market, namely 27 US companies included in the 
Dow Jones index, as well as 8 Blue-chip Russian companies. Further, we examine different sub-
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periods (2005-2006 – “normal”; 2007-2009 – “crisis”; 2010-2011 – “post-crisis”) to establish 
whether there is evidence of changing behaviour depending on the phase of the economic cycle. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on the 
efficient market hypothesis and market anomalies. Section 3 explains the method used for the 
analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The EMH was initially formulated by Fama (1965), who argued that in an efficient market prices 
should fully reflect the available information and be unpredictable (see also Samuelson, 1965). 
Fama (1970) then defined three forms of market efficiency (weak, semi-strong and strong). This 
theory has been used for the valuation of financial assets in terms of risk and uncertainty, and for 
devising portfolio strategies (see, inter alia, Sharpe, 1965; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966, and 
Treynor, 1962). In the 1980’s, it was highly criticized as overlooking transaction costs, information 
asymmetry (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), irrational behaviour etc. As a result many alternative 
theories and approaches were developed (behavioural finance, the adaptive market hypothesis, the 
fractal market hypothesis, etc.). 
The main implication of the EMH is that traders should not be able to “beat” the market and make 
abnormal profits. An extensive literature analyses whether instead there exist market anomalies that 
can be exploited through appropriate trading strategies. This term was first used by Kuhn (1970). 
Schwert (2003) is an example of a study providing evidence of abnormalities which are inconsistent 
with asset pricing theories. Shiller (2000) and Akerlof and Shiller (2009) take the view that there 
are deep reasons for the presence of anomalies in financial markets, namely irrational behaviour of 
investors (animal spirits, the herd instinct, mass psychosis, mass panic), which is inconsistent with 
the EMH paradigm.  
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Jensen (1978) argued that anomalies can only be considered statistically significant when they 
generate excess returns. Raghubir and Das (1999) classify them as follows: 
- Anomalies related to prices and returns (contrarian trading, value investing, the size effect, 
momentum effect, the effect of closed-end funds); 
- Anomalies associated with trading volume and volatility (panic, bubbles on the markets); 
- Anomalies associated with the time series (the M&A effect, the IPO effect); 
- Other anomalies. 
Jacobsen, Mamun and Vyshaltanachoty (2005) distinguished between calendar, pricing and size 
anomalies. Examples of calendar (time) anomalies (the most frequently observed) are: End-of-
Quarter Effect, Annual Worldwide Optimism Cycle Effect, Halloween Effect, 12-Month Cycle for 
Stock Returns Effect, Mid-year Point Effect, Two-Year Effect, Sector Performance by Calendar 
Month, Worst and Best Days of the Year Effect, January Effect, Monthly Effect, Turn-of-the-
Month Effect, Labor Day Effect, Day of the Dividend Payments Effect, Trading Around Option 
Expiration Days and others. 
Particularly important are intraday anomalies, including Half-of-the-Day Effects (abnormally low 
returns in the middle of a trading session, accompanied by a sharp fall in trading volumes); Last 
Hour and First Hour Effects (with the last hour of trading being the best, and the first hour the worst 
time in terms of returns); and the Time of the day anomaly (with securities tending to be up in the 
first 45 and last 15 minutes of the trading day). 
Harris (1986) and Thaler (1987) examined 15-minute intervals in asset prices movement to identify 
patterns in (the volatility of) returns (see also Levy, 2002, and Dimson, 1988). Harris (1986) found 
a time of the day anomaly in the first 45 minutes of a trading session of all days of the week except 
Monday and at the end of a trading day (approximately the last 5 minutes of the session). In his 
study of the Spanish stock market, Camino (1996) found positive returns in the first hour of the 
trading session in all trading days except Monday and Wednesday, and a strong tendency for prices 
6 
 
 
to rise in the first and last 15-minute periods of trading (see also Coroneo and Veredas, 2006). 
Wood, McInish and Ord (1985) reported jumps at the opening and closing of trading. Brooks, 
Hinich, Patterson (2003) found higher trading volumes in the NYSE at the beginning and the end of 
the day. The possibility of using the U-shaped pattern by market participants to build trading 
strategies was emphasized by Abhyankar, Ghosh, Levin and Limmack (1997). The same pattern 
was found with respect to trading volume, return volatility and liquidity profile by Tissaoui (2012) 
in the Tunisian Stock Exchange. Table 1 gives details of additional relevant studies. 
 
Table 1: Intraday anomalies: researches overview 
Author 
Type of 
analysis 
Object of analysis 
(time period, 
market) 
Results 
Harris (1986) 
Statistical 
analysis 
15-minutes intervals, 
fourteen months 
between December 1, 
1981, and January 31, 
1983, NYSE, USA 
 
The weekend effect spills over into the 
first 45 minutes of trading on Monday, 
with prices falling during this period. On 
all other days, prices rise sharply during 
the first 45 minutes and within the last 
five minutes of trading. 
Harris 
(1989) 
F-test 
Camino 
(1996) 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Twenty-three months 
of transaction records 
of the IBEX-35, at 15-
minutes intervals, 
Spain 
There are significant weekday 
differences in intraday trading returns in 
the first four hours of trading. On 
Monday (and Wednesday) returns are 
negative, while on the other weekdays 
they are positive. 
Brooks et al. 
(2003) 
Test for Signal 
Autocoherence 
Set of ten-minutes 
returns, 
bid-ask spreads, and 
volume for a sample 
of 30 NYSE stocks 
from 4 January 1999 - 
24 December 
2000, USA 
Find the signal coherence to be at the 
maximum at the daily frequency, with 
spreads mostly following an inverse J -
shape through the day and volume being 
high at the open and at the close and 
lowest in the middle of the day. 
Çankaya et 
al. (2012) 
GARCH(p,q) 
models 
15 minute intraday 
values of ISE-100 
Index period of 
August 2007 to 
February 201,  
Istanbul Stock 
Exchange, turkey  
Find that strong opening price jumps are 
present.  
 
Chan (2005) 
 
LOGIT model 
Hang Seng Index 
constituent stocks in 
Hong Kong Stock 
Find that the probability of trade at ask 
price over the last one minute of trading 
time significantly increases. This 
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Exchange 
from 1998 to 2004 
systematic pattern can explain around 
one-third of the positive return from the 
end-of-day effect. 
Coroneo and 
Veredas 
(2006) 
 
Quantile 
regression 
15 minutes sampled 
quotes midpoints 
during 3 years, from 
January 2001 to 
December 2003, of 
the 35 companies 
listed in the IBEX-35, 
Spanish Stock 
Exchange, Spain 
Show that indeed the conditional 
probability distribution depends on the 
time of the day. At the opening and 
closing the density ﬂattens and the tails 
become thicker, while in the middle of 
the day returns concentrate around the 
median and the tails are thinner 
Abhyankar et 
al. (1997) 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments 
(GMM) 
Intra-day bid-ask 
quotes covering the 
period 1 January, 
1991 to 31 March, 
1991 i.e. for the first 
quarter of 1991, 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Find that the average bid-ask spread 
follows a U-shaped pattern during 
trading hours 
 
Tissaoui 
(2012) 
Temporal 
analysis and 
spectrum 
analysis by 
using the 
Fourier 
Transform fast 
(FFT) 
38 shares, 9 months 
(October 2008 to the 
end of June 2009), 
Tunisian Stock 
Exchange, 
Tunisia 
 
Confirms that trading volume, return 
volatility and liquidity profile follow a 
U-shaped curve. All these variables are 
at the highest level at the opening of 
trading, decline rapidly in the middle of 
the day and then they increase again 
during the final minutes of trading. 
Strawinski  
and 
Slepaczuk  
(2008) 
Regression 
with weights, 
i.e. robust 
regression 
5-minute returns for 
the period: 2003-
2008) and daily data 
(for 10 years time  
span: 1998-2008) for 
WIG20 index futures, 
Poland 
Find strong jumps at the beginning of 
trading for all days except  
Wednesday and a positive day effect for 
Monday, as well as positive, persistent 
and significant jumps at the end of 
session.  
 
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
Although most studies suggest the presence of anomalies in the first 45 minutes (or first hour) of the 
trading session, their results differ in terms of the exact time when the end-of-the-day anomaly 
emerges: the last transaction, the last 5 minutes, the last 15 minutes, the last hour. Chan (2005) 
reported that the overall average returns per minute in the Hong Kong stock market (over the last 30 
min, over the last 10 min, over the last 5 min, and over the last 1 min) are statistically positive. 
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However, the majority of studies consider 15-minute intervals. Since the empirical literature does 
not provide clear evidence on intraday effects on specific weekdays (see, e.g., Strawinski and 
Slepaczuk, 2008, and Harris, 1989), and since it is difficult to distinguish between time of the day 
and day of the week effects, we focus specifically on the last 15 minutes before the end of the 
trading session (see Levy, 2002). 
We look at the intraday anomaly from the trader’s viewpoint: is it possible to make profits from 
trading on intraday patterns (which would indicate market inefficiency)? In particular, we test the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: first 45 min up effect exists (H1): 
- H1a – case of developed countries 
- H1b – case of developing countries 
Hypothesis 2: last 15 min up effect exists (H2) 
- H2a – case of developed countries 
- H2b – case of developing countries 
Hypothesis 3: the results for different periods (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis) are statistically 
different (H3). 
We use data at 15-minute intervals for 27 US companies included in the Dow Jones index and 8 
Blue-chip Russian companies. For the US the sample period is 2005-2011, and the following sub-
periods are also considered:  
- 2005-2006 – normal; 
- 2007-2009 – crises; 
- 2010-2011– post-crises. 
For Russia, owing to lack of data, the analysis is carried out only for the period 2011-2013.  
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Most studies on intraday anomalies do not incorporate transaction costs, even though trading is 
inevitably connected with spreads, fees and commissions to brokers. These costs can be divided into 
fixed and variable ones. The latter are present in each transaction. A typical example is the spread, 
which is incorporated into our analysis. Specifically, we programme a trading robot which 
automatically opens and closes positions according to the time of the day effect. Positions (in our 
case only the “long” ones) will be opened on “ask” price and closed on “bid” price, though we will 
incorporate the variable part of transactional costs in our analysis. The algorithm is constructed such 
that long positions are opened at the beginning of the trading session and are closed after 45 
minutes (the first 45 minutes up effect mentioned by Harris, 1986, and Levy, 2002), and are also 
opened at the end of the day. As we consider 15-minute intervals, they are opened in the last 15 
minutes of the trading session and are closed at the end of the session (the last 15 minutes of the day 
up effect mentioned by Levy, 2002). To test this algorithm (trading strategy) on historical data we 
use a MetaTrader trading platform which provides tools for replicating price dynamics and trades 
according to the trading strategy.  
Positive profits > 50% imply that H1 and H2 cannot be rejected. As for H3, we carry out t-tests: H3 
is rejected if t < tcritical.  
 
4.  Empirical Results 
The testing procedure comprises two steps, i.e. initially testing the first 45 minutes up effect, and 
then the last 15 minutes up effect.  
The complete results for the former are presented in Appendix A. A summary for different time 
periods is shown in Table 1a. 
 
 
 
Table 1a: Summary of testing results for the “first 45 min up effect”.  
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Period 
Average profit trades 
(% of total) 
Average total net 
profit 
Average net profit per 
deal 
2005-2006 44% -174 -0.374 
2007-2009 45% -336 -0.454 
2010-2011 43% -142 -0.420 
 
As can be seen, all periods were unprofitable, with the probability of a profitable trade being less 
than 50%. Hypothesis H1a is rejected, i.e. there is no evidence of a first 45 minutes up effect in the 
US stock market. Table 1b reports the t-test for H3 for different sub-periods: here is rejected in all 
cases. Table 1c shows that H3 is not rejected for net profit per deal in any of the sub-periods. 
 
Table 1b: t-test for profit trades (% of total) 
  
Mean Std.Dv. N Diff. 
Std.Dv. 
Diff. 
T df p 
2005-06 0.437129 0.047744             
2007-09 0.446955 0.030631 27 -0.009827 0.043375 -1.17720 26 0.249781 
2005-06 0.437129 0.047744             
2010-11 0.430666 0.047008 27 0.006463 0.051519 0.65187 26 0.520206 
2007-09 0.446955 0.030631             
2010-11 0.430666 0.047008 27 0.016290 0.051128 1.65555 26 0.109834 
 
 
Table 1c: t-test for net profit per deal 
  
Mean Std.Dv. N Diff. 
Std.Dv. 
Diff. 
T df p 
2005-06 -0.374775 0.334831             
2007-09 -0.454636 0.332846 27 0.079861 0.282592 1.46845 26 0.153979 
2005-06 -0.374775 0.334831             
2010-11 -0.419718 0.199970 27 0.044943 0.267637 0.87257 26 0.390885 
2007-09 -0.454636 0.332846             
2010-11 -0.419718 0.199970 27 -0.034918 0.319828 -0.56730 26 0.575377 
 
 
The complete results for the last 15 minutes up effect are presented in Appendix B. A summary for 
the different time periods is displayed in Table 2a. 
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Table 2a: Summary of testing results for the “last 15 min up effect” 
Period 
Average profit trades 
(% of total) 
Average total net 
profit 
Average net profit 
per deal 
2005-2006 26% -235 -0.538 
2007-2009 35% -351 -0.512 
2010-2011 31% -168 -0.544 
 
All periods were unprofitable, with the probability of a profitable trade being less than 40%. 
Hypothesis H2a is rejected: there is no last 15 minutes up effect in the US stock market. 
The t-tests for H3 for different sub periods are displayed in Table 2b: this hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, and this applies to all sub-periods. 
 
Table 2b: t-test for profit trades (% of total) 
  
Mean Std.Dv. N Diff. 
Std.Dv. 
Diff. 
T df P 
2005-06 0.256040 0.078941             
2007-09 0.352451 0.058585 27 -0.096411 0.059926 -8.35981 26 0.000000 
2005-06 0.256040 0.078941             
2010-11 0.313853 0.069267 27 -0.057813 0.082721 -3.63156 26 0.001213 
2007-09 0.352451 0.058585             
2010-11 0.313853 0.069267 27 0.038598 0.043483 4.61237 26 0.000094 
 
Table 2c shows that H3 is rejected for net profit per deal. There is no evidence of differences 
between sub-periods. 
 
Table 2c: t-test for net profit per deal 
  
Mean Std.Dv. N Diff. 
Std.Dv. 
Diff. 
T df P 
2005-06 -0.538260 0.477750             
2007-09 -0.511261 0.489490 27 -0.026999 0.093330 -1.50316 26 0.144847 
2005-06 -0.538260 0.477750             
2010-11 -0.544096 0.534294 27 0.005836 0.121219 0.25016 26 0.804429 
2007-09 -0.511261 0.489490             
2010-11 -0.544096 0.534294 27 0.032835 0.104634 1.63058 26 0.115035 
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The complete results for Russia are presented in Appendix C. A summary is provided in Table 3: 
H1b and H2b are rejected again, indicating the absence of the intraday anomaly being considered in 
a less developed market as well. 
  
  Table 3: Summary for the Russian stock market 
Hypothesis  
Average profit trades 
(% of total) 
Average total net 
profit per deal 
first 45 min up effect 41% -2 
last 15 min up effect 37% -1 
 
 
5.  Conclusions  
The empirical relevance of the EMH has been called into question by many studies finding 
evidence of so-called anomalies seemingly giving agents the opportunity to make abnormal profits. 
This paper argues that the presence of anomalies does not necessarily represent evidence of market 
inefficiency (risk-free profit opportunities): using a trading robot simulating the actions of a trader 
we show in the case of intraday patterns that, if transaction costs are taken into account, there are no 
profitable trading strategies (i.e. opportunities to make abnormal profits exploiting this type of 
anomaly), and therefore no evidence against the EMH. 
Specifically, we consider a well-known “time of the day anomaly”: prices tend to be up during the 
first 45 minutes and the last 15 minutes of the trading session. 
We test 3 hypotheses: 
- Hypothesis 1: first 45 min up effect exists (H1): 
- Hypothesis 2: last 15 min up effect exists (H2) 
- Hypothesis 3: results for different periods (pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis) 
are statistically different (H3) 
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These hypotheses are rejected for both the US and Russia, a mature and less developed stock 
market respectively. The only exception is H3: the results for the last 15 minutes up effect vary 
depending on the sub-period considered. 
On the whole, our analysis implies that it is not possible to exploit intraday patterns to make 
abnormal profits. This suggests that the results from previous studies purporting to provide 
evidence of exploitable profit opportunities resulting from market anomalies (which would be 
inconsistent with the EMH) were in fact misleading because they did not take into account 
transaction costs. The trading robot approach used in the present study can also be used to analyse 
other anomalies, but this is left for future work. 
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Appendix A 
 
First 45 min up effect 
 
2005-2006 
 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit trades  
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Alcoa 465 195 41.94% -256.1 
Altria Group 464 213 45.91% -28.9 
American Express Company 465 214 46.02% -46.6 
ATT Inc 458 191 41.70% -84.3 
Boeing 465 212 45.59% -315.7 
Coca-Cola 465 163 35.05% -247.4 
DuPont 465 217 46.67% -126.3 
ExxonMobil Corporation 465 209 44.95% -185.9 
General Electric Corporation 465 208 44.73% -85.2 
Hewlett-Packard Company 485 278 57.32% 138.2 
Home Depot Corp 465 208 44.73% -158.8 
Honeywell International Inc 465 219 47.10% -90.7 
IBM Corporation 465 168 36.13% -646.2 
Intel Corporation 465 200 43.01% -101 
International Paper Company 465 182 39.14% -256.9 
Johnson&Johnson 464 189 40.73% -159.8 
JP Morgan Chase 465 225 48.39% -26.1 
McDonalds Corporation 465 180 38.71% -270.3 
Merck Co Inc 465 229 49.25% -105.4 
Microsoft 465 220 47.31% -29 
MMM Company 465 197 42.37% -423.8 
Pfizer 465 185 39.78% -195 
Procter Gamble Company 465 211 45.38% -145.4 
United Technologies Corporation 465 173 37.20% -429.1 
Verizon Communications Inc 485 185 38.14% -249.1 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc 464 213 45.91% -129.1 
Walt Disney 465 219 47.10% -54 
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2007-2009 
 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades  
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Alcoa 740 322 43.51% -447.6 
Altria Group 740 322 43.51% -169.3 
American Express Company 728 300 41.21% -629 
ATT Inc 739 321 43.44% -272.7 
Boeing 739 330 44.65% -761.2 
Coca-Cola 740 340 45.95% -326.9 
DuPont 740 339 45.81% -299.6 
ExxonMobil Corporation 740 373 50.41% 119.1 
General Electric Corporation 740 281 37.97% -559.6 
Hewlett-Packard Company 740 381 51.49% 58.2 
Home Depot Corp 740 311 42.03% -274.8 
Honeywell International Inc 740 328 44.32% -546.7 
IBM Corporation 740 331 44.73% -1005.4 
Intel Corporation 738 328 44.44% -226.7 
International Paper Company 740 338 45.68% -254.4 
Johnson&Johnson 740 332 44.86% -286.9 
JP Morgan Chase 740 322 43.51% -406.6 
McDonalds Corporation 740 317 42.84% -365.4 
Merck Co Inc 740 369 49.86% -112.2 
Microsoft 740 355 47.97% -102.5 
MMM Company 739 335 45.33% -478 
Pfizer 740 301 40.68% -200.6 
Procter Gamble Company 740 358 48.38% -122.4 
United Technologies Corporation 740 301 40.68% -658.7 
Verizon Communications Inc 740 319 43.11% -307.7 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc 740 330 44.59% -224.7 
Walt Disney 740 339 45.81% -208.3 
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2010-2011 
 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades  
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total 
net 
profit 
Alcoa 334 134 40.12% -112.1 
Altria Group 339 118 34.81% -129 
American Express Company 339 164 48.38% -110 
ATT Inc 339 111 32.74% -192.7 
Boeing 339 159 46.90% -153.6 
Coca-Cola 339 139 41.00% -213.8 
DuPont 338 168 49.70% -41.5 
ExxonMobil Corporation 339 137 40.41% -215.5 
General Electric Corporation 339 142 41.89% -113.3 
Hewlett-Packard Company 339 177 52.21% -23.1 
Home Depot Corp 339 164 48.38% -44.2 
Honeywell International Inc 339 151 44.54% -125.1 
IBM Corporation 339 149 43.95% -296.5 
Intel Corporation 339 135 39.82% -155.4 
International Paper Company 339 166 48.97% -80.1 
Johnson&Johnson 339 141 41.59% -130.8 
JP Morgan Chase 339 160 47.20% -162.8 
McDonalds Corporation 339 140 41.30% -205 
Merck Co Inc 339 134 39.53% -162.2 
Microsoft 339 131 38.64% -186.5 
MMM Company 338 151 44.67% -144.5 
Pfizer 339 131 38.64% -109.9 
Procter Gamble Company 339 152 44.84% -141.2 
United Technologies Corporation 339 139 41.00% -252.7 
Verizon Communications Inc 339 130 38.35% -218.4 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc 338 157 46.45% -90.3 
Walt Disney 338 158 46.75% -28.9 
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Appendix B 
 
Last 15 min up effect 
 
2005-2006 
 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades  
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Alcoa 465 195 41.94% -256.1 
Altria Group 464 213 45.91% -28.9 
American Express Company 465 214 46.02% -46.6 
ATT Inc 458 191 41.70% -84.3 
Boeing 465 212 45.59% -315.7 
Coca-Cola 465 163 35.05% -247.4 
DuPont 465 217 46.67% -126.3 
ExxonMobil Corporation 465 209 44.95% -185.9 
General Electric Corporation 465 208 44.73% -85.2 
Hewlett-Packard Company 485 278 57.32% 138.2 
Home Depot Corp 465 208 44.73% -158.8 
Honeywell International Inc 465 219 47.10% -90.7 
IBM Corporation 465 168 36.13% -646.2 
Intel Corporation 465 200 43.01% -101 
International Paper Company 465 182 39.14% -256.9 
Johnson&Johnson 464 189 40.73% -159.8 
JP Morgan Chase 465 225 48.39% -26.1 
McDonalds Corporation 465 180 38.71% -270.3 
Merck Co Inc 465 229 49.25% -105.4 
Microsoft 465 220 47.31% -29 
MMM Company 465 197 42.37% -423.8 
Pfizer 465 185 39.78% -195 
Procter Gamble Company 465 211 45.38% -145.4 
United Technologies Corporation 465 173 37.20% -429.1 
Verizon Communications Inc 485 185 38.14% -249.1 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc 464 213 45.91% -129.1 
Walt Disney 465 219 47.10% -54 
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2007-2009 
 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades  
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Alcoa 740 322 43.51% -447.6 
Altria Group 740 322 43.51% -169.3 
American Express Company 728 300 41.21% -629 
ATT Inc 739 321 43.44% -272.7 
Boeing 739 330 44.65% -761.2 
Coca-Cola 740 340 45.95% -326.9 
DuPont 740 339 45.81% -299.6 
ExxonMobil Corporation 740 373 50.41% 119.1 
General Electric Corporation 740 281 37.97% -559.6 
Hewlett-Packard Company 740 381 51.49% 58.2 
Home Depot Corp 740 311 42.03% -274.8 
Honeywell International Inc 740 328 44.32% -546.7 
IBM Corporation 740 331 44.73% -1005.4 
Intel Corporation 738 328 44.44% -226.7 
International Paper Company 740 338 45.68% -254.4 
Johnson&Johnson 740 332 44.86% -286.9 
JP Morgan Chase 740 322 43.51% -406.6 
McDonalds Corporation 740 317 42.84% -365.4 
Merck Co Inc 740 369 49.86% -112.2 
Microsoft 740 355 47.97% -102.5 
MMM Company 739 335 45.33% -478 
Pfizer 740 301 40.68% -200.6 
Procter Gamble Company 740 358 48.38% -122.4 
United Technologies Corporation 740 301 40.68% -658.7 
Verizon Communications Inc 740 319 43.11% -307.7 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc 740 330 44.59% -224.7 
Walt Disney 740 339 45.81% -208.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
2010-2011 
 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades 
Profit 
trades (% 
of total) 
Total net 
profit 
Alcoa 308 58 18.83% -95 
Altria Group 308 78 25.32% -101.4 
American Express Company 308 127 41.23% -97.5 
ATT Inc 308 112 36.36% -89.4 
Boeing 308 96 31.17% -210.9 
Coca-Cola 308 92 29.87% -198.1 
DuPont 308 124 40.26% -93.9 
ExxonMobil Corporation 308 106 34.42% -207 
General Electric Corporation 308 88 28.57% -94.6 
Hewlett-Packard Company 308 107 34.74% -136.9 
Home Depot Corp 308 86 27.92% -124.9 
Honeywell International Inc 308 122 39.61% -100.2 
IBM Corporation 308 34 11.04% -947.6 
Intel Corporation 308 91 29.55% -105.5 
International Paper Company 308 115 37.34% -79.5 
Johnson&Johnson 308 118 38.31% -115.4 
JP Morgan Chase 308 119 38.64% -101.1 
McDonalds Corporation 308 79 25.65% -250.4 
Merck Co Inc 308 94 30.52% -110.5 
Microsoft 308 99 32.14% -122.3 
MMM Company 308 109 35.39% -190.7 
Pfizer 308 76 24.68% -106.3 
Procter Gamble Company 308 78 25.32% -236.8 
United Technologies Corporation 308 101 32.79% -224.2 
Verizon Communications Inc 308 116 37.66% -89.2 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc 308 85 27.60% -182.6 
Walt Disney 308 100 32.47% -112.8 
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Appendix C 
 
Results for Russian stock markets 
 
First 45 min up effect 
 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades  
Profit 
trades 
(% of 
total) 
Total 
net 
profit 
Profit 
per deal 
GAZPROM 286 148 51.75% 66.5 0.23252 
GAZPROM NEFT 264 95 35.98% -173 -0.6553 
LUKOIL 287 132 45.99% -557 -1.9408 
NORILSKY NICKEL 285 106 37.19% -434 -1.5228 
ROSNEFT 287 127 44.25% -123.6 -0.4307 
SBERBANK 286 136 47.55% -275 -0.9615 
SURGUTNEFTEGAZ 287 134 46.69% -335 -1.1672 
VTB BANK 242 50 20.66% -1757 -7.2603 
 
Last 15 min up effect 
 
Company 
Total 
trades 
Profit 
trades  
Profit 
trades 
(% of 
total) 
Total 
net 
profit 
Profit 
per 
deal 
GAZPROM 378 185 48.94% -2.4 -0.0063 
GAZPROM NEFT 347 45 12.97% -459 -1.3228 
LUKOIL 378 154 40.74% -94 -0.2487 
NORILSKY NICKEL 378 168 44.44% -236 -0.6243 
ROSNEFT 378 181 47.88% -9.9 -0.0262 
SBERBANK 378 171 45.24% -547 -1.4471 
SURGUTNEFTEGAZ 378 152 40.21% -179 -0.4735 
VTB BANK 320 38 11.88% -26.4 -0.0825 
 
 
  
